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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law: Tax Exemption and Religious Freedom:
For nearly two hundred years, the various governmental units of
the nation have granted property tax exemptions to religious organiza-
tions where the property is used for religious purposes. Walz v. Tax
Commissioner of the City of New York,' however, marks the first time
that the United States Supreme Court has been called upon to rule on
the constitutionality2 of this practice.
In Walz the appellant was a real estate owner in Richmond County,
New York, who sought an injunction to prevent the Tax Commissioner
of New York City from granting property tax exemptions on property
owned by religious groups and used solely for religious purposes, as
per a statutory enactment. 3 He argued that such an exemption consti-
tutes a subsidy and indirectly requires him to make a contribution to
religious organizations in violation of his First Amendment Religious
Freedoms.
The depth with which this practice has become engrained in our
society is displayed by the unanimity with which both the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division4 and the New York Court of Ap-
peals5 reached their decisions, virtually without comment. It was not
until the case reached the United States Supreme Court that a dissent-
ing voice was raised, the dissent being lodged by Justice Douglas.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger,
noted that the twin Religion Clauses 6 of the First Amendment are cast
in absolute terms which, if carried to a logical extreme, would tend to
'397 U.S. 664 (1970).
2 In Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), however, the court did
rule that a specific church was not entitled to a tax exemption on specific
property under the wording of a District of Columbia law, without ever
questioning the constitutionality of the law itself.
3 Real Property Tax Law, N.Y. Consol. Laws, c 50-A § 420 which in its pertinent
parts reads:
"Real property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively
for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, for religious,
bible, trust, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educa-
tional, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical soci-
ety, library, partiotic, historical, or cemetery purposes .. . and used ex-
clusively for carrying out thereupon one or more such purposes . . . shall
be exempt from taxation as provided in this section."
The statute was enacted under authority granted by the New York State
Constitution, article 16 § 1 which states:
"Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemp-
tions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal
property used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes
as defined by law and owned by any corporation or association organized
or conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not oper-
ating for profit."
4 30 App. Div. 2d 778, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 353.
5 24 N.Y. 2d 30, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 711, 246 N.E. 2d 517.
6 "Congress shall make up no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. .
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clash with each other. The purpose of these clauses is to state an objec-
tive and to mark the boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement be-
tween church and state. As the court observed, rigidity in application
could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions.
In Walz, the court held that the question of tax exemptions for
religious organizations falls within a neutral area between the twin
prohibitions. The court has employed this reasoning and argument in
some of its previous decisions,7 but in those cases the argument was
used to reject any contention that government hostility to religion is
necessary to meet anti-establishment guarantees of the constitution.
Walz goes further than these cases by directly recognizing, for the first
time, the possibility and permissibility of benevolence in neutrality.8
Thus, hostility is not required and benevolence is not completely for-
bidden.
The court noted that either taxation or exemption requires some
governmental interference. Since complete and total separation of
church and state is virtually impossible, it therefore is not so much a
question of whether there is involvement, but rather, whether the in-
volvement is excessive. In determining whether the involvement is ex-
cessive, it shall be necessary to ascertain whether "it is a continuing one
calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermis-
sible degree of entanglement."9
The sole dissent by Justice Douglas' ° was based on the contention
that Torcaso v. Watkins" governs the case rather than Everson v. Board
of Education.2 In Torcaso the plaintiff was denied a government ap-
pointment because he refused to take an oath affirming his belief in
the existence of God. There the court ruled that government could not
constitutionally pass laws that aid all religions and all believers as
opposed to nonbelievers. Everson, on the other hand, as Douglas points
out, involved an activity where the State could act independently of,
as well as concurrently with, the Church-such as in providing for the
safety of students by furnishing transportation to school."3 Douglas
7 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (providing secular textbooks
for both public and parochial school students), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961) (depriving public benefits or office to those whose religious
practices conflict with the predominant religion), McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961), Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday "Blue
Laws"), Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), Illinois ex rel McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (use of "released time" programs in
public schools to provide for religious instruction), Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (public transportation of parochial school pupils).
8 397 U.S. at 669.
9 Id. at 675.
10 Id., at 700-727.
11367 U.S. 488 (1961).
2330 U.S. 1 (1947).
13 397 U.S. at 697.
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continues that since government cannot provide a place of worship, an
exemption for churches is a constitutionally invalid subsidy.
Applying the reasoning of Torcaso to this case, Douglas contended
that since believers, as organized in church groups, are exempt from real
estate taxes, while non-believers, whether organized or not, must pay
the real estate tax at the usual rate, the grant of tax exemption is
unconstitutional. But what is actually involved here is the tax exempt
status of religious organizations. The believer, like the non-believer, still
pays at the usual tax rate for the real property that he owns. The tax
exemption merely means that the believer's decision to engage in reli-
gious activity does not result in an indirect contribution of an additional
tax because of his religious beliefs.
On the organizational level it could be observed that generally be-
lievers organize while non-believers do not. However, this does not
necessarily mean that non-believers could not take advantage of the
tax exemption should they choose to organize and as such to own real
estate. Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion "supposed" that the tax
exemption would extend to "groups whose avowed tenets may be anti-
theological, atheistic and agnostic. ' 13 justice Douglas assumed just the
opposite. 14 Although the court did not pass judgment on this question,
it wouldd appear that since secularism is, to a large extent, a "religous"
belief of its own, any policy that would cast special burdens on believers
over non-believers would be an action that would favor one "religion'
over others in violation of the First Amendment's Religious Guaran-
tees. In this case, taxation of churches would favor those with secular
beliefs, since the exercise of their "religion" involves no formal organi-
zation of ownership of real estate which would be subject to that tax
which believers, through their church organizations, would have to pay.
An exemption, on the other hand, treats all religious attitudes equally,
since no religion bears an extra burden because of a special feature of
its practice.
Distinguishing the present case from Everson, Douglas noted that
while in that case the church activity being supported was one which
the government could independently engage in, a tax exemption goes
directly to support the practice of religious worship-an activity for-
bidden to the government. Thus, Douglas argues, a distinction must be
made between church qua church and church qua non-profit, charitable
institution. 5 While government aid and support may be given to
church activities falling in the latter category, it may not do so for
those falling in the former area. The straight tax exemption makes
no such distinction.
14 Id., at 713.
15 Id., at 708.
16 Id., at 674.
1971]
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Such a distinction could very well lead to government interference,
involvement and entanglement in religion which the neutrality doctrine
seeks to minimize. 6 The majority pointed out that to give exemptions
only to the extent the church operated as a non-profit, charitable organi-
zation would require government evaluation and standards as to the
worth of the programs. This would be necessary since the extent and
type of such welfare services would vary from church to church depend-
ing upon such factors at the location of the church (urban or rural)
and the weath of its congregation. In addition, as Justice Brennan
observed in his concurring opinion, such a distinction for taxation pur-
poses assumes -that church owner property can be described as either
wholly secular or wholly religious in its use.17 Furthermore, the major-
ity argued, the effect of such a distinction would be to tax churches
that could afford it the least, since "poor" churches could not sustain
the type and extent of welfare activities which the "rich" churches
could engage in. Thus, the distinction favored by Douglas could work
to the benefit of some religions over others, depending upon the success
of the dogma and, more importantly, the wealth of its constituency.' s
Douglas concluded his dissent with an expression of his fear of
gradual encroachment upon our religious liberties by decisions such
as this one. The fear is, of course, one which Douglas' colleagues have
expressed in the past, such as Justice Black in his dissent in Board of
Education v. Allen.19 In Walz, however, his colleagues evidently thought
that the fear was misplaced and inappropriate. As Chief Justice Burger
stated "if tax exemption can be seen as this first step toward 'establish-
ment' or religion, as Mr. Justice Douglas fears, the second step has
been long in coming. '"20
In analyzing Wa/z, the general purpose of tax exemption cannot
be ignored. The purpose of such a policy is to encourage the existence
of private institutions that foster the communities' "moral and mental
improvement." Thus, at issue here, is whether some institutions which
fall within this category should be excluded because they are religious
in nature. The majority in Walz held that, in this instance at least,
there isn't any serious establishment or interference of religion involved
that would necessitate denying groups a tax exemption, granted under
17 Id., at 688.is Id., at 674.
'9Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), upheld the right of states
to provide secular textbooks to all pupils, regardless of whether they attended
public or parochial schools. Justice Black, in dissent, while noting that the
law did not formally adopt or establish a state religion, maintained that
" . . it takes a great stride in that direction and coming events cast their
shadows before them." Black, Douglas and Fortas (in separate opinions) all
felt that such a law would encourage each religion to look toward complete
domination and supremacy of their particular religion through both the school
board and the state legislature.
20397 U.S. at 678.
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sound public policy, just because they are religious. "The State has an
affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabiliz-
ing influences in community life and finds this classification useful,
desirable and in the public interest." 21
Unlike earlier cases, the court refrained from making any sweeping
and specific statement as to what is and is not permissible under the
Religious Guarantees of the First Amendment, noting that such state-
ments make it difficult to develop general principles on a case-by-case
basis.22 But here the court did attempt to describe a general approach-
the benevolent neutrality doctrine-and to propose a standard-the
continuing, official surveillance test. Such general principles, of course,
still leave unanswered questions, most notably those including the vari-
ous types of aid being given to the faltering parochial school systems,
such as the state and federal funds to build and improve the facilities
of church affiliated college campuses and as the shared time programs
of some public secondary school systems. In addition, questions involv-
ing the tax-exempt status of church-owned profit making property
may soon be presented.2 3
Significantly, Walz also leaves the constitutionality of taxing re-
ligious organizations in question. In the past the court has found license
taxes on religious activities to be especially abhorrent to the First
Amendment, noting the destructive influence of taxation in general,
and stating that "[t]he power to tax the exercise of a privilege
is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. ' 24 Wdz itself helps
raise the question when it points out that although both exemption and
taxation require some involvement, taxation requires the greater
amount, as it gives rise ". . . to tax valuation of church property, tax
liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that
follow in the train of those legal processes. '25 On the other hand,
The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement
between church and state and far less than taxation of churches,
It restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state and
tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insu-
lating each from the other. 26
Indeed, applying the Walz test of excessive involvement, one could
argue that taxation would call for "official and continuing surveillance
leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement" in religious activi-
ties. With the almost universal application of tax exemptions for reli-
gious groups, however, this question is one that probably will not arise
soon.
211d. at 676.
22 Id. at 674
231d. at 674.24 Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105 (1943).




Beyond its immedate impact of upholding tax exemptions on reli-
gious properties, the importance of Walz lies (1) in its recognition of
benevolence in neutrality and (2) its adoption of the continuing, official
surveillance test. The general nature of these rules quite likely will
reduce the importance in future decisions of the more sweeping and
specific utterances found in the Everson Rule. Adoption of the Walz
Rules undoubtedly adds a new, significant, and substantial element to
church-state questions which means that many hard decisions face the




As the concern for environmental protection mounts, interest in the
use of the private nuisance action as an antipollution weapon has in-
creased.' Two recent cases may have an impact on the continuing use-
fulness of this method of air pollution control. One, a Wisconsin
Supreme Court Case, has reaffirmed the appropriateness of an award of
damages in a private nuisance action regardless of any counterveiling
social utility of the polluter's enterprize. The other, handed down by
the prestigious New York Court of Appeals, has severely limited the
utility of such an action when court-ordered abatement is the only effec-
tive remedy.
Nuisance: Air Pollution and the Doctrine of Comparative Injury:
In Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative,' the Wisconsin Supreme
Court allowed money damages in a nuisance action without balancing
the gravity of the harm against the social utility of the offending con-
duct.
lost was an action for damages only, brought by three farmers
against their local electric utility for injury to their crops and land
caused by sulphurous gases emitted into the atmosphere by the power
company's plant. The jury found these emissions to be both a continu-
ing nuisance and the cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiffs and
set the total damage to the plaintiffs' crops at $1,080. The jury also
found a $500 loss of market value to one of the plaintff's farms.
'Recent commentary on the private remedies to environmental pollution includes
the following: Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 Natural Resources
Law 475 (1970); Note, Role of the Private Nuisance Law in the Control of
Air Pollution, 10 ARiz. LAW REv. 107 (1968) ;
Comment, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. LAW REv. 734
(1970); Comment, Private Legal Action for Air Pollution, 19 COLUM. LAW
REv. 480 (1970) ; Note, Water Quality Standards in Private Nuisance Actions,
79 YALE LAW J. 102 (1969).
145 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969).
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